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Russia: the challenges of transformation 
 
Dutkiewicz, Piotr and Trenin, Dmitri, (eds.)  
NYU Press, New York, USA 
 
Foreward by Craig Calhoun 
 
For seventy years Western policy-makers and social scientists obsessed anxiously 
over the Soviet threat. For twenty years after the collapse of the USSR they have 
underestimated the importance of Russia. It is time to move past both exaggerated 
anxiety and relative neglect. Likewise, since the collapse of the Soviet Union Russian 
intellectuals themselves have vacillated between overstated assertions of the country’s 
power and importance and insecure catalogs of unfavorable international comparisons 
highlighting its weaknesses and problems. Again, understanding Russia today demands 
moving beyond these misleading extremes. And understanding Russia is crucial to 
understanding what sorts of futures are open on a global scale. 
 
Russia is a major power. Its territory and its natural resources are huge. Though 
its military was disrupted and damaged during the post-communist transition – not least 
as equipment was stolen and sold abroad - it remains a nuclear power. After a wrenching 
transformation from communism to capitalism, Russia’s economy is extremely uneven; 
massive profits haven’t translated into either widespread economic opportunity or enough 
investment in new technology and other long-term sources of growth. But the Russian 
economy is nonetheless one of the world’s largest – and larger in purchasing power parity 
than nominal values would suggest. It has great growth potential. The Russian state is 
beleaguered by its own transitional problems but has achieved considerable stability. 
Some leaders call for modernization and others for a new nationalism but there is little 
doubt that most share a commitment to economic development led by a strong state. 
Russia still faces enormous challenges in achieving stable economic growth, in delivering 
social services, in maintaining security throughout an ethnically diverse and far-flung 
territory. But how Russia faces these challenges is not just a local question, it is a 
question of global significance.  
 
This makes the current book both timely and important. In it, a group of leading 
Russian intellectuals and social scientists join with front-rank researchers from around 
the world to examine processes of social, political, and economic transformation in 
Russia. Some of these processes are pursued as an active project, often under the label of 
“modernization”. This is sometimes articulated as a more scientific and internationally-
oriented counterpart to nationalism. The two are not sharply opposed, however, and the 
authors here show how political challenges and ambitions interact with agendas for 
institutional reform and economic growth. At the same time, the chapters make clear that 
neither politics nor economics alone holds the key to Russia’s future, since questions of 
social inequality and participation and more generally of social reproduction will also be 
decisive. Part of the contribution of the book is, indeed, to show how these three 
dimensions are inextricably interconnected.  
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At the same time, the authors do not shy away from critical perspectives on 
challenges facing Russia, both in its domestic policies and in its international relations. 
Indeed, for there is no likely future in which Russia’s global context will not be a basic 
factor in its domestic affairs – and likewise, Russia’s domestic successes and failure’s 
will inform what kind of international actor it is and whether it will be a force for stability 
or disruption on a global scale. It is appropriate that this book is published as part of the 
Possible Futures series in which distinguished social scientists explore factors that shape 
ways in which global order – or disorder – may develop over the coming decades. 
 
The Return of Geopolitics 
 
Russia is one of a small number of states that will play leading roles in an 
increasingly multilateral - or more worryingly, multipolar - world. US hegemony is in 
decline, and with it five centuries of EuroAmerican global domination. But neither the 
US nor Europe will fade from global power. Indeed, the US remains the world’s leading 
power. Its hegemony may decline slowly or more precipitously; in either case, the precise 
way in which it adapts to a less dominating role will be crucial. How much European 
countries will act in concert and how much as separate nation-states also remains to be 
seen. The experiment in European unity is echoed in other regional blocks; at the same 
time countries distant from each other are developing new models for cooperation, both 
in international organizations and in bilateral relationships. If the end of hegemony is not 
to be the beginning of chaos, cooperation among major powers will be vital. Along with 
the United States, Russia, China, India, Brazil, and Turkey are all likely to be leaders, 
perhaps along with Iran, South Africa, and others. 
 
Those not part of this big country club will not be irrelevant or unilaterally 
dependent. Some small countries wield disproportionate financial clout; some have 
remarkable natural resources. Europe is not the only region trying to achieve greater 
strength or security or market standing by regional integration. This is likely to be 
important to South America, Africa, and Asia (whether or a larger or a subregional scale). 
Russia itself will act not only as an individual nation-state but also as the hegemonic 
power in its region. And beyond spatially compact regions, religions and solidarities of 
language or culture will bind otherwise diverse countries. Western Christendom and the 
Orthodox world may or may not overcome longstanding divisions to unify Christendom 
but both will matter. Likewise the Umma Islam will contend with it's own schismatic 
tendencies but also keep extending and renewing long-distance links. 
 
Crucially, geopolitics may well return to center stage. It never became irrelevant, 
though it was pushed into the background during the eras of global European empires, 
capitalist integration of the modern world system, and enormous but asymmetric 
expansion in technological capacities. There was a fantasy of air travel and electronic 
communications linking the whole into a synchronous whole, though this was never 
altogether achieved. Today both unequal development and economic crises limit 
capitalist unity, and for all the remarkable speed of global communications, these are 
used as much to mobilize people on lines of cultural difference as to overcome such 
difference. The political geography of the near term future may look in some ways like 
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the eras of empires past. One of the pioneers of modern geography, Sir Halford 
Mackinder, saw the center of the Eurasian landmass as “the pivot of history”. Politicians 
between the World Wars were impressed by his notion that Germany and Russia needed 
to be separated by an East European buffer lest they be joined by force or diplomacy and 
come to dominate the world. But Mackinder also worried about a new Asian empire 
integrating Russia with China and Japan. If his specific political predictions don't arouse 
the fears they once did, Mackinder’s broader arguments about the literal centrality of 
Central Asia may gain renewed currency. Traffic across and along the coasts of the great 
Eurasian landmass is once again linking the political economies and cultures of the 
supercontinent. Russia is of pivotal importance. 
 
At the same time, the future of Russia is inextricably bound-up with the future of 
the modern world-system. This is true partly because of the disproportionate importance 
of energy and other natural resource exports to the Russian economy. Trade requires 
markets. But as the current unusually hot summer is reminding policy-makers, Russia is 
an importer too. And the issues are not just net trade balances but specific relationships, 
especially with other countries throughout Asia and the Middle East. Politics and 
economics cannot be fully separated. The modern world system organizes capitalist 
production and trade on the basis of a division of labor with unequal returns. Resource 
trade gives Russia an advantage, but to gain a position in the relatively advantaged upper 
tier of the world system depends on complementing extractive industry with higher 
value-added production and developing more openness to entrepreneurial innovation. 
And this Russia does in competition with other countries – and in recent years it has been 
at a disadvantage both directly because of institutions that were slow to change and 
indirectly because opportunities elsewhere led to brain drain. Russians have founded 
capitalist businesses that lead the world – most famously Google – but not in Russia.  
 
Politics and Social Reproduction 
 
 Here economic challenges are entangled with social and political ones. Economic 
activity in Russia remains marked by the wrenching transformation from communism, 
the rapid but strikingly inequitable privatization of many assets, and the challenges of 
transforming Soviet-era industries into effective capitalist ones. It has begun to develop a 
financial infrastructure, but this is heavily dependent on both the state and global capital 
markets. The crisis of 2008 hit hard, particularly because Russia had invested heavily in 
dollar-denominated securities and more generally accepted a good deal of Western 
economic advice. The financial crisis, and the weakness of the global financial regulatory 
system, shocked many. Some responded with renewed nationalist and calls for a romantic 
withdrawal from global integration. Others responded with calls for further 
modernization, but with greater controls to protect Russian interests.  
 
As neoliberalism was discredited globally, more than a few Russians felt 
confirmation for what they already knew. Russian leaders already thought an anti-state 
liberalism was bankrupt not just intuitively but because of the social chaos of Russia’s 
go-go years in the 1990s. The shock therapy recommended by the IMF and American 
economists like Jeffrey Sachs had indeed produced a transition to markets, but with little 
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fairness, attention to the public interest, protection for ordinary citizens, or development 
of state capacity. Radical market reforms with weak institutional supports had produced 
hyperinflation and then the Russian financial crisis of 1998. Millions were plunged into 
poverty. At the same time, wealth became extremely concentrated producing an 
extravagant class of the new rich. Corruption not only became endemic but also took on 
large-scale organized character in the combination of criminal economic activity in 
Russia and heavy reliance on off-shore havens for unregulated and untaxed business.   
 
Many of the policies of the Putin years that followed were a response. They re-
established some level of state control and sought to reduce the independent power of the 
new super-rich “oligarchs”. Critics contend that corruption remains widespread and that 
insiders close to the government are still able to accumulate huge fortunes. They argue 
that democratic freedoms and human rights have been curtailed along with economic 
liberalism. Even if the critics are right, the government achieved much greater 
macroeconomic stability – before the shock of the global crisis – and simply much more 
control. The need for this was felt not only because of economic chaos but also because 
of major security challenges – not least as fighting in Chechnya and Central Asia more 
generally was linked to terrorist incidents in Moscow.  
 
Russia is a reminder we need to shake ourselves free of the illusion that states are 
fading from the forefront of global affairs. For twenty years after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the right wing and much of mainstream academic economics celebrated an 
illusory neoliberal vision not just of free trade but of reduced roles for state policy and 
regulation, and in too many cases striking elimination of public services, including those 
hard won by generations of workers' struggles (themselves shaken by the disappearance 
of the global alternative suggested by the USSR). The financial crisis that came to a head 
in 2008 brought a renewal of Keynesianism with enormous financial bailouts and 
stimulus packages. Some economists argue the Keynesian policies haven’t been strong 
enough; others criticize the extent to which they were organized to benefit corporate 
elites, investors and especially the financial industry more than ordinary citizens. But in 
any case, both the policies and the debates signal much wider recognition of the 
importance of states to economic stability and long-term productivity and prosperity. This 
is not just an issue of right-wing, thought, however, since during the same period that 
neo-Hayekians and monetarists promoted economic liberalism an anti-authoritarian left 
was equally suspicious of states. Proper stress on the importance of civil society, social 
movements, and international organizations too often slipped into imagining that they 
could some home substitute for the work of states. At an international level, the idea 
spread that globalization would somehow bring in its wake not just a rich array of 
international connections but “cosmopolitan democracy” or at least new forms of 
governance that would dramatically reduce the importance of states – and do this in the 
interest of ordinary people not only capitalist corporations. 
 
Russian disillusionment with neo-liberal globalization is now shared by a variety 
of movements and politicians elsewhere. As deeply as China is committed to 
globalization, it is also strongly nationalistic at the level of both government policy and 
popular sentiment. The so-called new nationalisms of Latin America have brought 
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forward critiques and alternative policies. And indeed there are critics in the US and 
Europe, though generally not among central policy-makers. The point is not that all these 
different critics of neoliberalism now want to follow the same path. It is rather that 
observers should be clear that states and state interests, sometimes bolstered by strong 
nationalist identities, are pivotal to political and economic affairs.  
 
But the issues faced by states are not only matters of political power or economic 
growth. They are matters of social reproduction. Here again, Russia exemplifies the 
broader pattern. Enormous wealth is concentrated in a narrow class. Too much of this 
wealth flows offshore and too little into productive investments at home. Too few jobs 
and opportunities for economic mobility are created. The government attempts to deal 
with some of the issues by regulatory means, but much depends on social development. 
“Modernization” is a code word with many meanings, including updating technology and 
making government bureaucracies more efficient. But it also necessarily means 
attempting to build or rebuild institutions that deliver public services and thereby using 
national wealth in ways that benefit a wider range of citizens and strengthen social 
solidarity. Nationalist ideology by itself is a weak substitute for policies that ensure that 
all citizens share in economic benefits and have opportunities for social, economic, and 
political participation – though it can be a support for such policies. And if modernization 
and nationalism are currently evocative terms, we shouldn’t imagine they exhaust the 
conceptual frameworks for possible futures. Where, we might ask, does religion fit into 
Russia’s future as religious practice grows both within the Russian Orthodox Church and 
outside of it. Where does concern for the environment fit in? Environmental challenges 
are becoming increasingly important and also pose basic questions about the conditions 
under which social life can be reproduced – and in some cases the costs of reproducing 
environmentally unsustainable social systems. 
 
In Russia’s case, many older institutions inherited from the Soviet Union were 
allowed to deteriorate through years of underfunding and poor management. Compared to 
other countries of comparable economic standing Russia still has a highly educated 
population, for example, but it has suffered sharply from both brain drain and neglect of 
its educational institutions. The Soviet scientific establishment that was world-leading in 
many fields simply has not been reproduced, and the same is true at many levels of the 
educational system. Russians with mathematical skills have been exported to become 
economists or MBAs in the United States. Health care has suffered in similar ways and 
the effects are evident very directly in life-expectancy. In each case there are private 
alternatives for some, but not for most of the population.  
 
Communism offered an approach to social reproduction, to ensuring that the 
benefits of industrialization and economic growth were distributed widely and became 
the bases for improvements in both the condition of social life and the capacity of citizens 
to contribute to social life. Different approaches were developed in capitalist countries 
during the late 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, from public education systems to welfare states. 
Some of the innovations came specifically in response to crises like the Great Depression 
and were accompanied by expansion of economic regulations to try to minimize such 
crises and the damage they do to social reproduction. It is not likely that Russia will 
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return to communism. And in many of the world’s capitalist countries there is a massive 
curtailment of public services now underway as a result of fiscal stringencies. In a sense, 
debt-burdened countries of the rich world are being asked to impose “structural 
adjustment” on themselves – as they through the IMF asked it of poorer countries in the 
1980s. In the West as in Russia, however, the question of social reproduction is not likely 
to vanish. On the contrary, it is moving to the forefront, becoming a challenge as basic as 
economic growth and macro-economic stability or national security. 
 
 Russia is in crisis today partly because of specific Russian circumstances, but 
partly because the world is in crisis. Conversely, the continuing transformation of Russia 
is of central importance to efforts to build a new world order today as well as to efforts to 
create a flourishing national future. This book is published alongside a series of efforts to 
look globally at the “possible futures” that are open as the world deals with financial 
crisis, declining US hegemony, rapid growth in Asia, and a range of other challenges 
from environmental degradation to infectious diseases. Russia is a vital shaping influence 
on these possible futures. This book is a good place to start giving Russia the intellectual 
attention it deserves. 
 
